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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

OWEN RAY KNUTESON
Plaintiff and
Appellant

vs.
JACQUELINE A. KNUTESON

Case No. 16615

Defendant and
Respondent

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is plaintiff's appeal from the court's finding that
defendant was not residing with a person of the opposite sex, as
provided for under Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended,, and from the order of the court denying plaintiff's motion
to terminate alimony.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Piaintiff filed his affidavit in support of an Order to
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Show Cause, upon which the court entered its order requiring
defendant to show cause why the alimony

award~d

to defendant under

a Decree of Divorce should not be terminated because defendant was
residing with a person of the opposite sex.

The hearing was held by

the court on December 19, 1979, whereupon the court found that
defendant had not been living with a person of the opposite sex, as
referred to in Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953,, as
amended, and extended its order denying plaintiff's claim that
alimony should be terminated.

From this Order and Judgment plaintiff

appeals.
, RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the order of the lower court
reversed, and for an order terminating alimony.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A contested divorce was heard by the trial court on the
13th of August 19 79, with the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree of Divorce being entered.by the court on September 10,
1979 (R pg

After the trial of the divorce matter, but before the
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decree was signed and entered by the court, defendant, on about
August 27, 1979 (Tr 26), moved from the home awarded to her,
moving a part of her furniture (Tr 24), and most of her personal items,
and moved into the house of a male friend, Gay Conder, where she
resided until approximately November 7, 1979 (Tr 29).

During this

period of time, she occupied the bed and bedroom with Conder (Tr 30),
and engaged in regular sexual intercourse (Tr 20), living, as it were,
like husband and wife.

Plaintiff learned of defendant's conduct and

filed his motion for termination of alimony.

Before defendant was

served with the court-rs Order to Show Cause, she moved from Conder's
home and returned to her own home, but continued to have sexual
relations with Conder (Tr 21).

The conduct and sexual relations

between the defendant and Conder were admitted by both in their
testimony before the court (Tr 20, 30).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLALl\ITIFF WAS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER
TERMINATING ALIMONY REQUIB.ED TO BE PAID
TO DEFENDANT BY REASON OF DEFENDANT'S

3 by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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CONDUCT, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH
SECTION 30-3-5(3), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, AS AMENDED.
This matter is primarily one of fact and definition of
the law, and appears to be one of first impression before the court.
Plainti~f

maintains that the undisputed facts before the

court show that even prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, and
continuing after its entry, that defendant was residing with a person
of the opposite sex, with an admitted conduct of regular sexual contact.
In filing his motion for termination of alimony, plaintiff

relied upon Section 30-3-5(3)., Utah Code Annotated 19 53, as
amended, which provides:
11

(3) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony
to a former spouse shall be terminated upon application of that party 'establishing that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite
sex, unless it is further established by the person
receiving alimony that the relationship or association
between them is without any sexual contact. 1 "
(Emphasis mine).
The wording of this section of the statute appears to be
mandatory, since it says that the alimony order "shall be terminated"
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upon establishing that the former spouse is residing with a person
of the opposite sex.

Here, not only did plaintiff establish that

defendant was residing with a person of the opposite sex, but he
established that the defendant had moved in with furniture, personal
property, and with her minor children, and lived as husband and wife,
occupying the same bed and enjoying regular sexual "contact;" all of
this while plaintiff was under an order of the court to support her by
the payment of alimony.

All of the provisions of Section 30-3-5(3)

have been met and, clearly, the intent of the legislature, to prevent
the injustice of alimony being paid to a former spouse who chooses to
live with another partner, has been established.
It is conceded that a single incident of sexual misconduct
was not the concern of the legislature but, in the case before the
court, defendant's conduct is no mere single incident.

Here, she

moved in, brought her fi.txniture, personal property and children, and
children, and gave her new partner all of the benefits of marriage,
without the legalititY of marriage.

The fact that she was not living

in Mr. Conder' s home at the time the matter was finally heard by the

5
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·court, should not alter the truth of the fact that, she had been, and was,
living with him when the plaintiff requested the court's assistance.
These are the facts that exist, notwithstanding the court's conclusion
·that defendant was not residing with a member of the opposite sex, as
defined by Section 30-3-5(3).
Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2nd Edition,
defines the word ureside" as:
"To dwell permanently or for a length of time;
to have a settled abode for a time; to abide;
to live in or at. "
From this definition, and from the facts, it seems clear that the
defendant, by living with Mr. Conder from August 27 to November 7,
certainly did reside with him.
The issue here is purely one of statutory construction.
The courts of this state have no common-law jurisdiction over divorce
or its incidents.

The power to modify a provision for alimony is only

such as is conferred by statute.
Prior to the enactment of

30~3-5(3)

in 1979, remarriage

of the former wife was generally necessary before alimony could be
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terminated.

In 1979, the legislature, recognizing the great change

in personal relationships brought about by the era of "new morality",
enacted Section 30-5-5(3), in order to allow the courts to consider
the effect of newly formed relationships upon the requirement to pay
alimony.

The language is unequivocal in its position, and it is clear

that the legislature intended the courts to recognize current sociorealities in applying the statute.
Unlike the provisions of the California laws which,
prior to 1976, required proof that a former spouse was living with
a person of the opposite sex, and holding himself or herself out as
the spouse of the person for a total of 30 days, and which now only
provides that there is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden
of proof of decreased need for support in the event of cohabitation
with the opposite sex (California Civil Code, Sec. 4801. 5); Section
30-3-5(3) requires only that the former spouse resides with a pers_on

of the opposite sex.
Therefore, the fact. that defendant elected to enter
into a meretricious relationship should be sufficient to justify the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization7provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

termination of alimony.
POINT II
THE COURT SHOULD REQUIRE DEFENDANT
TO REPAY ALL ALIMONY RECEIVED BY HER.

Since defendant,, as established by her own testimony,,
moved into the Conder ho.me and began to reside with him even before
the Decree of Di.vorce was entered,, it seems only proper that all
monies paid to her as alimony should be returned to the plaintiff.
While this subject has not been addressed by this court,
it was considered by the California court in the matter in In re
Marriage of Ludwig,, 130 Cal Rptr 234.

There, the court held:

11

Upon receipt of support money after January,
1975, where a spouse is holding himself or herself
out il'l: the manner operative under 4801. 5, the
receiving spouse is no more than an involuntary
trustee of the funds received. Upon proper
motion to the court, and proof of the operative
facts to the satisfaction of the court, its order
properly shall issue requiring return of those
funds.''
The trial court did not consider this question, having
determined that defendant was not residing with a person of the
opposite sex, as contemplated by Section 30-3-5(3).

It is the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

prerogative of this court, acting in equity to consider this question
and to enter its order requiring repayment of the alimony paid by
plaintiff to defendant.

King v. King,, 478 P2 492; 25 Ut2 163.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the facts before the court, plaintiff respectfully
submits that the provisions of Section 30-3-5(3) are applicable,, and
that the conduct of the defendant was exactly that contemplated by
the legislature in enacting that provision.

Thus, the trial court

committed error in failing to grant plaintiff's motion for termination
of alimony.

This court should therefore reverse the trial court and

enter an order terminating the provisions of the Decree of Divorce
requiring plaintiff to pay to defendant alimony in the sum of $150 per
month.

Additionally, the court should enter its order requiring

defendant to repay all sums paid to her as alimony.
Respectfully submitted this
WALTER R. ELLETT

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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